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THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
HAS SENTENCING REFORM OVERSTEPPED
SEPARATION OF POWERS?*
Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989)
Petitioner moved to have the United States Sentencing Commission's Sentencing Guidelines declared unconstitutional.1 Petitioner alleged establishment of the Commission violated the separation of powers and the nondelegation doctrines . 2 The district court rejected
petitioner's delegation argument and found the Commission comparable to an executive agency and the Guidelines similar to substantive
rules promulgated by other agencies.3 The district court sentenced
petitioner according to the Guidelines. 4 On certiorari, 5 the Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, and HELD, that
Congress neither violated the separation of powers doctrine nor delegated excessive legislative power.6 The Supreme Court found the establishment of the Commission as an independent agency in the judicial
branch, the requirement of at least three federal judges on the Commission, and the grant of limited appointment and removal power to
the President constituted a valid governmental structure. 7

*Editor's Note: This comment received the Huber Hurst Award for the outstanding case
comment submitted in the Spring 1989 semester.
1. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). Petitioner and another were indicted on three counts centering
on a cocaine sale. Id. The U.S. Sentencing Commission is a body created under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1987) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (Supp. V 1987).
Id. at 649.
2. Id. Petitioner claimed Congress delegated excessive authority to the Commission to
structure the Guidelines. Petitioner also claimed the Act's requirement for article III federal
judges to serve on the Commission was unconstitutional.
3. Id. The district court also rejected the claim that the requirement that article III federal
judges serve on the Commission was unconstitutional.
4. Id. at 654. Under the Guidelines, the district court sentenced petitioner to 18 months
imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. The court also imposed
a $1,000 fine and $50 special assessment.
5. Id. The Supreme Court granted both the petitioner's and the United States' petitions
for certiorari. Petitioner filed notice of appeal to the circuit court, but the Supreme Court,
pursuant to its Rule 18, granted certiorari before judgment.
6. Id. at 675. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority, and Justice Scalia filed a dissenting
opinion.
7. Id.
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Rising dissatisfaction with sentencing disparities and doubts as to
the success of rehabilitation spurred Congress to enact the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984.8 Pursuant to the Act, the U.S. Sentencing Commission became an independent agency with authority to promulgate
regulations.9 As other agencies before it, the Sentencing Commission
was destined to be challenged as a violation of the separation of powers
doctrine. 10
To fully analyze a separation of powers challenge, it is necessary
to look first to the doctrine's constitutional foundation. In The
Federalist Paper No. 47, Madison expanded Montesquieu's notion of
political liberty.", Political liberty demands that no governmental department wholly control the power exercised by another department.12
However, the Constitution's Framers also recognized that some degree
of control was necessary to check the usurpation of power in one
branch. 13 Thus, separation of powers depends not so much on strict
divisions of power, but on a limited degree of necessary branch interaction.
In the twentieth century, the concentration of governmental power
shifted from the legislative branch to the executive branch. 14 Courts,
however, continue to limit branch interaction through the separation
of powers doctrine. 15 Courts often quote Justice Jackson's concurring

8. Id. at 651 n.3 (Senate Report on the 1984 legislation, S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983) corresponding House Report, H.R. REP. No. 1017, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)).
The Sentencing Reform Act is codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559 (1987) and 28 U.S.C. §§
991-998 (Supp. V 1987).
9. Id. at 652-53. The Act established the Sentencing Commission as an independent commission in the judicial branch of the United States government. The Commission is responsible for
promulgating determinative-sentence guidelines.
10. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835-36 (1986)
(challenging congressional grant of authority to hear common law counterclaims in reparation
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (challenging legislative veto by one house over I.N.S. decision not to
deport a nonimmigrant student); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 418 (1944) (challenging
delegation to Price Administrator of the legislative power to control rent prices).
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 300-03 (J. Madison).
12. Id. at 301, 303.
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308-11 (J. Madison).
14. Id. at 309-10. Although the framers' notion of tyranny was based on their experience
with England's George III, the framers feared the greatest danger of usurpation of power was
in the legislature because of its extensive powers and its access to the pockets of the people.
See Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLuM. L. REV. 371 (1976) (discussing
the growing power of the executive).
15. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986) (holding that legislation granting Congress
removal power over an executive officer violates the separation of powers doctrine); Immigration
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opinion from Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Co. v. Sawyer as espousing
the current principle of separation of powers. 16 Youngstown presented
a challenge to the President's authority to seize steel mills absent
congressional legislation.17 In rejecting this use of the President's
power, Jackson defined government in terms of "separateness but
'
interdependency, autonomy but reciprocity."18
Jackson developed a
power continuum, whereby one branch's authority to act fluctuated
with another branch's authority to take related action.19 Under
Jackson's theory, presidential power to seize steel mills fell on the
low end of the spectrum. 20 The President's seizure of the steel mills
was incompatible with the will of Congress.21 Moreover, the Constitution explicitly granted exclusive authority to Congress to take such
actions." Thus, Jackson declared the President's acts unconstitutional.3
At the other end of Jackson's continuum, the President's powers
are maximized when acting pursuant to congressional authority.- This
power, however, is not absolute. The nondelegation doctrine limits

& Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (holding that legislation authorizing a
legislative veto by one house over an I.N.S. decision not to deport a nonimmigrant student
violates the separation of powers doctrine).
16. 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 582-83. The President issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession and operate most of the nation's steel mills. Id. at 583. Under threat
of a steelworkers' strike, the President claimed the action was necessary to ensure continued
production of steel for war materials. Id. The majority opinion rejected the claim and held the
executive order unconstitutional. Id. at 587. Absent constitutional and congressional authority,
the President lacked the power to execute his own policy. Id. at 588.
18. Id. at 635.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 640.
21. Id. at 586. Although Congress was silent when the President issued the order, Congress
previously rejected a seizure technique in an amendment proposed to the Taft-Hartley Act. Id.
Compare Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (President's effort to
remove Federal Trade Commissioner held contrary to congressional policy and an impingement
on congressional control) with Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (affirming President's
exclusive removal powers as an inherent executive power derived from the power to appoint).
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in the
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.").
23. 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (the executive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative power).
24. Id. at 635. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, the scope of authority includes presidential rights plus other rights that Congress
may delegate. Justice Jackson also recognized a "zone of twilight" when the President acts
relying solely on his own independent power and absent congressional grant or denial of authority.
Id. at 637.
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the authority Congress may constitutionally grant to other branches
and agencies. The Constitution initially vests all legislative power in
Congress.? Yet, this provision has been qualified by the necessary
and proper clause to afford Congress flexibility to establish reasonable
standards to carry out its policies.26 Thus, Congress may delegate
some degree of legislative power.
The Supreme Court struck down a congressional act for excessive
delegation of legislative power in Panama Refining Co. v. United
States.- In PanamaRefining, the Supreme Court struck down legislation authorizing the President to determine policy concerning transportation of "hot oil" as an unconstitutional delegation of the power
to make laws.2 In the same year, the Court declared a portion of the
National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional on similar grounds
in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.2 No Court majority has subsequently applied the nondelegation doctrine to invalidate
an act of Congress.30
Recently, the Court has turned its focus toward excessive limitations on executive powers rather than excessive delegation of power
to the executive branch and its agencies. In Morrison v. Olson,31 the

25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
26. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
27. Id. at 389. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 667 (1944) (no excessive delegation
of power found where Congress defined policy and prescribed standards for the agency to follow
in formulating regulations).
28. 293 U.S. at 416. Oil produced or transported in excess of statutory quota is known in
the industry as "hot oil." Id. at 436 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
29. 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935). Congress granted the function of formulating a fair competition code without sufficiently defining policy or standards.
30. See, e.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892) (no excessive delegation of power found
where Congress makes the revival of an act dependent upon presidential proclamation following
ascertainment of a fact prescribed by Congress); Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394 (1928) (no excessive delegation of power found where legislative act provides an
intelligible principle to which the body authorized to fix customs rates is directed to conform);
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 667 (1944) (no excessive delegation of power found where
Congress provided policy and standards to direct the Office of Price Administration in regulating
maximum prices of commodities and rents).
31. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). The Ethics in Government Act provides that where reasonable
grounds to initiate an investigation exist, the Attorney General may request the Special Division
to appoint an independent counsel. The Special Division is a court created by the Act. Once
appointed, the independent counsel has full power and independent authority to exercise all
investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Department of Justice on matters within its
jurisdiction. The Attorney General may remove the independent counsel for good cause or
terminate the office when the counsel's functions are complete or substantially complete. Id. at
2602-04.
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Court held the Ethics in Government Act, 32 providing for a special
prosecutor to investigate and prosecute alleged criminal acts by certain
high ranking officials, did not violate the separation of powers doctrine.
The Court again looked to Madison's theory of constitutional separation
of powers as a safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement
of one branch at the expense of another.3 However, the Court noted
the doctrine does not require all three branches to operate with absolute independence.- The Court focused on whether the Act unduly
interfered with the executive branch. 5
The Morrison Court did not limit its analysis to executive and
legislative powers but also examined powers granted to the judiciary.
The Court found that, generally, no executive or administrative duties
of a nonjudicial nature may be imposed on article III judges.3 6 Nonetheless, the Court held that the powers granted to the Special Division
to appoint independent counsel did not encroach on areas reserved for
the other branches 37 or threaten the independence and impartiality of
the judiciary.3 Thus, the Court found strict separation of power inapplicable and allowed for some branch interaction 9

32. 28 U.S.C. § 591-599 (Supp. V 1987).
33. 108 S. Ct. at 2620. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 736 (1985) (violation of separation
of powers for Congress to have removal power over an executive officer); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam) (violation of separation of powers for congressional officers
to appoint members of an executive commission); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161
(1925) (violation of separation of powers for Congress to require removal of certain postmasters
only with the advice and consent of the Senate).
34. 108 S. Ct. at 2621. See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 441 (1977)
(no violation of separation of powers where Congress directes an executive branch officer to
obtain presidential records); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (although presidential actions declared unconstitutional, Jackson's concurring opinion recognizes that interdependence and reciprocity between branches may be constitutional).
35. 108 S. Ct. at 2616-17, 2621. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 443 (appropriate separation of
powers inquiry is whether congressional legislation disrupts the balance of power to the extent
that it prevents the executive branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned function).
36. 108 S. Ct. at 2612. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 123 (1976) (per curiam) (holding
that president pro tempore of Senate's and the Speaker of the House of Representatives's
appointment of members to an executive commission violated the Appointment Clause of the
Constitution).
37. 108 S. Ct. at 2612-15. The Act does not give the Special Division executive power to
supervise the independent counsel's exercise of investigative or prosecutorial authority.
38. Id. at 2615. Because the Ethics in Government Act does not grant the Special Division
any power of review over the independent counsel, risk of partisan or biased adjudication is
avoided. The Act prevents members of the Special Division from participating in any judicial
proceedings concerning matters within the independent counsel's jurisdiction. See Commodity
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The instant case confirms the Morrison policy that commingling
of government power is not a per se violation of the separation of
powers doctrine.40 The Sentencing Commission did not encroach on
the powers reserved for the executive branch or threaten the integrity
of the judiciary.41 Furthermore, the instant Court distinguished
Panama Refining to determine that the Sentencing Reform Act was
42
not an excessive delegation of legislative power.
The instant Court initially addressed the nondelegation doctrine,
which is one aspect of the broader separation of powers theory. 43 The
instant Court analyzed the nondelegation doctrine on two levels. First,
the Court held, in light of precedent, the Sentencing Reform Act
sufficiently specified and detailed congressional policy.- Thus, on the
face of the Act, the Court found that the Commission lacked authority
to determine legislative policy. 45 The Court then questioned whether
the Act delegated excessive discretion to the Commission to formulate
the Guidelines.46 Although the duties granted to the Commission require a degree of discretion, the Act sets sufficient standards for the
Commission to follow in carrying out congressional policy4 7 The Court
concluded that Congress retained its legislative power while appropriately delegating the labor-intensive task of formulating determinative-sentencing guidelines to the Commission. 48 Therefore, the Sentencing Reform Act complied with the nondelegation doctrine.49
Second, finding that Congress appropriately delegated rulemaking
authority, the Court examined the structure of the Commission to
determine whether it violated the broader separation of powers doc-

Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1986) (no infringement on article III
judges to permit Commodities Futures Trading Commission to exercise jurisdiction over common
law counterclaims).
39. 108 S. Ct. at 2612-15. See Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion which finds that article
II, § 1 of the Constitution grants all executive control to the President. Thus, the issue is not
how much the Act reduces the President's control but whether it deprives the executive of
exclusive control over purely executive power. Justice Scalia considered it unconstitutional to
grant prosecutorial powers to an agency not within complete executive control. Id. at 2626-28
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. 109 S.Ct. at 660.
41. Id. at 667, 672-73.
42. Id. at 655 n.7.
43. Id. at 655.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 658.
46. Id. at 656-57.
47. Id. at 658.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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trine. Expanding Morrison,the instant Court applied Madisonian principles to find the degree of overlapping responsibility in the sentencing
procedure constitutional. ° Historically, the sentencing procedure was
shared by all three branches. 51 Accordingly, the Act appropriately
located the Commission in the judiciary 52 as an independent rulemaking
body and properly required article III judges to serve on the Commission.-" These provisions neither vest power reserved for another
branch in the judiciary 54 nor threaten the integrity of the judiciary.Furthermore, the Court found that the President's limited appointment and removal powers do not prevent the judiciary from performing
its constitutionally assigned functions.The Sentencing Reform Act presents a unique governmental structure, never before tested by separation of powers standards. 7 Although the Guidelines remedy some sentencing disparities among similarly situated offenders, Congress may have overstepped the constitutional bounds of the separation of powers doctrine. 58 The constitutionality of the Act's allowance for a degree of control over sentencing
by each branch is supported by the previous sentencing procedure. 59
The Legislature maintains its constitutional responsibility for determining the outer limits of criminal sanctions. The judiciary, through
judges serving on the Commission and courts applying the Guidelines,
continues to determine what sentence is warranted.61 Finally, although
the Act diminishes executive control by abolishing the parole function,
the President retains a degree of power over members of the Commis-

50. Id. at 658-61.
51. Id. at 650-51.
52. Id. at 667.
53. Id. at 673.
54. Id. at 665-66.
55. Id. at 665, 672.
56. Id. at 675.
57. Id. at 661. The Court notes the peculiarity of an institution within the judicial branch
that is not a court and does not exercise judicial power.
58. See generally Liman, The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States Sentencing
Commission, 96 YALE L.J. 1363 (1987); Ogletree, The Death of Discretion?Reflections on the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1988).
59. 109 S. Ct. at 650. Before the Sentencing Reform Act, an indeterminate system was in
effect. Congress set broad ranges for sentences, allowing judges wide discretion in sentencing,
supplemented by discretionary parole provisions in the executive branch.
60. Id. at 656. Congress directed the Commission not to exceed the statutory maxima for
sentences.
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)-(b) (1987); 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (Supp. V 1987).
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sion.62 Nonetheless, similarities to the previous system cannot alone
protect the reform from constitutional challenges.
The establishment of the Commission as an independent agency
within the judiciary should be closely scrutinized under the separation
of powers doctrine. The instant Court justified this placement by
analogizing the Sentencing Commission to the independent counsel
authorized in Morrison.- Unlike Morrison, conflict of interest within
the executive branch was not a chief concern in the instant case.6
Thus, the only justification for placement of the Commission in the
judiciary is the historical discretion judges have exercised in determining sentences.- As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent, independent
agencies are more appropriate in the executive branch since it is
inconceivable that the President alone could carry out his constitutional
duties to execute the laws.- On the other hand, the judiciary and
legislature are capable of performing their duties with only the assistance and advice of agencies.67 Therefore, absent conflict of interest,
the Commission as an independent agency should be located in the
executive branch. Although the judiciary would lose some degree of
control, the presence of judges on the Commission would ensure judicial participation in establishing the Guidelines.
More problematic than the placement of the Sentencing Commission
within the judiciary, is the delegation of rulemaking authority to the
Commission. The instant Court relied on Madisonian principles of
necessary branch interaction.6 Unlike the Youngstown conflict between the authority of two constitutional branches of government, the
Sentencing Commission's authority is independent of the three
branches. 69 Justice Jackson's theory of one branch's power building on
the authority granted it by another branch is misplaced. 70 Congress
has the constitutional authority to do what is necessary and proper
to enact legislation, but independent agencies are not granted constitu-

62. 28 U.S.C. §§ 991, 994, 995(a)(1) (Supp. V 1987). The President may appoint voting
members of the Commission. The President may also remove these members of the Commission
for neglect of duty, malfeasance or for good cause.
63. 109 S. Ct. at 666, n.20.
64. See 108 S. Ct. at 2611.
65. 109 S. Ct. at 664-65.
66. Id. at 681-82.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 659.
69. Id. at 652; see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube, Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
70. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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tional powers.7 Thus, the instant case should not be analyzed as the
constitutional power of one branch building on that of another branch.
A better analysis would be to scrutinize the joining of judicial and
legislative powers in an independent agency.
Furthermore, the instant Court permits Congress to delegate its
legislative responsibilities without fully considering alternative structures. 72 The instant Court relies too heavily on its history of upholding
the Legislature's delegation of its rulemaking authority.7 3 Concededly,
Congress did not grant the Sentencing Commission the broad discretion struck down in Panama Refining.74 Congress explicitly defined
the policies to be achieved by the Commission's application of numerous
specified criteria.7 5 However, under the current procedure, the
Guidelines automatically go into effect if Congress does not act.76 Congress claims this delegation is necessary since it lacks the expertise
to formulate the Guidelines. 77 However, the Constitution prohibits the
Legislature from delegating its constitutionally mandated legislative
function. 78 Thus, a better approach would be to create an advisory
committee. 79 Although the committee would still determine the appropriate Guidelines, the Guidelines would then be subject to legislative
°
and executive scrutiny before obtaining the status of law.s
Undeniably, the Sentencing Reform Act is an honorable attempt
to limit sentencing disparities. 8 ' Our legal system prides itself on the
principle of treating similarly situated offenders alike.82 That same
3
system, however, professes to be a government of laws not men.
Placing power to deprive individuals of their liberty in the hands of
an independent commission, rather than under the wisdom of the
legislature, executive or judiciary, presents serious problems. The
best solution would be to make the Commission a judicial rulemaking

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Liman, supra note 58, at 1367.
109 S. Ct. at 654-56.
Id.; see also Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 55 S. Ct. 241 (1935).
109 S. Ct. at 654-56.
28 U.S.C. § 994(c) (Supp. V 1987).
109 S. Ct. at 658.

78,

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.

79. Liman, supra note 58, at 1368.
80. Id.
81. 109 S. Ct. at 651-52.
82. Id. The Court recognized the serious impediment an indeterminate sentencing system
placed on evenhanded and effective operation of the criminal justice system.
83. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (Justice Marshall's discussion
of an individual's right to the protection of laws).
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committee with the legislative and executive branches exercising limited control over its actions. Thus, the judicial branch would be able
to reduce sentencing disparities while holding the constitutional
branches of government responsible for the impact of the Guidelines
on individuals' liberty.
Laura A. Eidson

